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Expert Witness Malpractice
Michael Flynnt

Introduction
Today is the big day! You have done all you can think of to do. You
are nervous and anxious but hopeful that all will work out right. You are
introducing (and letting others become acquainted with) someone who
is important to you. We have all felt this experience at least once.
Sometimes it all works out but other times, despite all your preparation
and planning, the result is not what you had hoped. This happens in
personal and family relationships and even to trial lawyers!
Trial lawyers spend countless hours and money to select, prepare and
present expert witnesses designed to convince juries of the correctness
of the plaintiffs or the defendant's case. Yet despite this effort,
sometimes the lawyer's own hand-selected expert witness's testimony
fails to deliver. There are plenty of places to lay blame-the lawyer, the
opposing lawyer, the jury, and the judge are all likely targets to explain
and rationalize what went wrong. However, in some instances it may
be the expert witness who is to blame, even a friendly expert witness.
There are many times when a lawyer's own expert witness falters and
surprises the lawyer and unexpectedly damages the client's case. The
result is a situation that is very difficult for a trial lawyer, who then has
to scramble to undo, remedy and recover the case from the ineffective
testimony of the lawyer's own expert witness. Sometimes it becomes
impossible to erase the expert witness testimony and the case ends badly
for your client. Well, maybe not!
This article explores the option to sue a friendly expert witness for
negligence, in the form of professional malpractice. The first segment
of this article examines the long-standing immunity from lawsuits that
is granted to friendly witnesses, including expert witnesses, by the party
who called the witness or hired the expert witness. The article then
t B.A. magna cum laude (1973), Gonzaga University; J.D. cum laude (1977),
Gonzaga University School of Law. Michael Flynn is a Professor of Law at Nova
Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law. Professor Flynn extends
special appreciation to Zeyna Lahoud for expert research and writing assistance in the
production of this Article.

16

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY

[Vol. 42:15

analyzes case law that seems to begin to remove this immunity that is
granted to friendly expert witnesses. Finally, this article examines a trial
lawyer's liability for using an expert witness found to be negligent.

I. The Expert Witness Rule
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Briscoev. LaHue, stated
succinctly that
[a] witness who knows that he might be forced to defend a subsequent
lawsuit, and perhaps to pay damages, might be inclined to shade his
testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and
thus to deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted
evidence .... But the truth-finding process is better served if the witness'
testimony is submitted to "the crucible of the judicial process so that the
factfinder may consider it, after cross-examination, together with the other
evidence in the case to determine where the truth lies." 2

Based in part on this statement, the Briscoe Court granted immunity from
a subsequent civil lawsuit to police officer fact witnesses whose testimonies in trial were false and misleading.3 In Briscoe, the plaintiffs claimed
they were victims of perjured testimony in their criminal trials and only
convicted because ofthe false testimony." The lower court dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims against the police officer witnesses in the same opinion
and the United States Supreme Court accepted the case for review.' The
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's dismissal and concluded that
the common law specifies immunity from lawsuits against a witness
unless subsequent litigation would modify this result.' The Supreme
Court then offered examples ofmodification, including perjury.' In turn,

'460 U.S. 325 (1983).
460 U.S. at 333-34 (citation omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 440 (1976) (White, J., concurring)).
3
Id. at 325.
4 Id. at 327.
5
Id. at 327-28.
6
Id. at 345-46.
7
Id. at 342.
2 Brscoe,
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this principle ofwitness immunity has expanded overtime to cover expert
witness testimony.
It is important to note that this immunity from a civil lawsuit would
not include immunity from criminal prosecution for perjury.' However,
the lasting impact of the Briscoe ruling has protected witnesses from
subsequent civil lawsuits over the witness' testimony. '0 This courtdeclared doctrine has long been a part of the common law and certainly
provides some comfort to witnesses but no remedy for litigants prejudiced
by potentially lying or mistaken witnesses." This ruling shielded expert
witnesses who have carelessly provided testimony or even lied to a trier
of fact.12 Granted, to prove that a negligent or lying expert witness is the
cause of a client losing a lawsuit is not an easy burden of proof, but the
Briscoe ruling precludes even a chance to do so." However, this longstanding legal doctrine of immunity from a subsequent civil lawsuit for
a party's own expert witness is showing signs of erosion as some states
have allowed lawsuits by lawyers and parties against their own expert
witnesses for malpractice.1 4
Generally, there are two types ofwitness immunity: immunity against
civil liability for harm caused by the testimony and immunity against

8*Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs, Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 669 (Wash. 1989)
(en banc) ("[An expert witness] is a participant in ajudicial proceeding. It is that status
on which witness immunity rests.").
9Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 341-43 (stating that, although apolice officer is shielded from

civil liability for perjury, "[a] police officer . .. may be prosecuted subsequently for

perjury").
'0 Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S 356, 367 (2012) (citingBriscoe, 460 U.S. at 332-33).
" See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330-31 ("The immunity of parties and witnesses from
subsequent damages liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings was well
established in English common law." (citing Cutler v. Dixon, 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B.
1585); Anfield v. Feverhill, 80 Eng. Rep. 1113 (K.B. 1614); Henderson v. Broomhead,
157 Eng.
Rep. 964, 968 (Ex.1859))).
2
1 See San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co. ofN.Y., Inc., 737 F.2d 246,254
("[I]t is settled
under Briscoe v. LaHue that a witness has absolute immunity from § 1983 liability
based on the substance of his trial testimony." (citations omitted)).
1 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345.
'4 See, e.g., LLMD ofMich., Inc. v. Jackson, 740 A.2d 186, 191 (Pa. 1999) (finding
the justifications for absolute witness immunity did not apply to suits against experts
alleging professional negligence when the allegations did not relate to the substance of
the witnesses' testimony).
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criminal prosecution based on the testimony." If the witness lies in a
deposition or lies in court during-trial, the witness may be prosecuted for
the crime of perjury.
Multiple state courts have ruled that expert witnesses are no longer
afforded absolute immunity from civil liability if the witness is found to
have negligently carried out her professional duties." In cases involving
negligence in the expert's performance rather than what the expert's
conclusion actually is, and such negligence allegedly contributes to the
client losing the lawsuit, immunity does not protect the expert.18 In such
a lawsuit, having to prove that one of the contributing causes of the party
losing the lawsuit was the negligence 6f the expert witness in providing
testimony is analogous to a legal malpractice case." Such a lawsuit is
essentially two cases in one with the plaintiffs burden being to not only
show negligence on the part of the lawyer but then also show that a jury
or other trier of fact would have found for the plaintiff had the lawyer
not acted negligently.2 0 So too in the expert witness malpractice case,
the plaintiff would have to hurdle the burden of two lawsuits with proof
of causation resting in a successful judgment in the second retrial of the
original lawsuit.

15 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-507 (2013) (providing for the possibility of
prosecution for perjury for witnesses granted immunity to testify under a court order);

Andrew Jurs, The Rationalefor ExpertImmunity or LiabilityExposure andCaseLaw
Since Briscoe:ReassertingImmunity ProtectionforFriendlyExpert Witnesses, 38 U.

MEM. L. REV. 49, 51-52 (2007) (citing Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345-46) (describing the
U.S. Supreme Court decision that "granted immunity specifically to trial fact witnesses
...

even if the witnesses perjured themselves on the stand").
1 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (West 1994) (prescribing "fine[s] . . . or imprison[ment]

[for] not more than five years, or both" for individuals who lie in a court proceeding

while under oath).

1 See LLAD ofMich., 740 A.2d at 191 (allowing a professional malpractice action
to proceed against an expert witness); see also Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d
671, 672 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) ("hold[ing] that witness immunity does not bar suit if
the professional is negligent in providing the agreed services").

'8 LLMD ofMich., 740 A.2d at 191.

'9 Forensis Group, Inc. v. Frantz, Townsend & Foldenauer, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622,
635 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted).
20 See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 787-88
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (noting various cases that required the plaintiff to bear a 'trialwithin-a-trial' burden to prove a malpractice claim).
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California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wyoming do not offer absolute witness
immunity to experts hired by the same party seeking redress.2 1 New
Jersey and Vermont allow expert witness civil liability against experts
appointed by the court rather than a party to the case, and New Jersey and
West Virginia do not provide absolute witness immunity to witnesses
testifying for the opposing party.

II. The Erosion of Immunity for Witnesses,
Specifically, Friendly Expert Witnesses
In recent years, several state courts have examined and analyzed the
conflicting rationales for granting immunity from civil liability for the
negligent friendly expert witness and for the removal of such immunity.
In Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court found, in LLMD Michigan, Inc.
v. Jackson-Cross Co.,23 that the witness immunity doctrine did not bar
a "professional negligence" action against the expert witness.2 4 In the
underlying case, Wintoll filed a breach of contract suit against Marine
Midland Realty and UsLife.2 5 Shortly thereafter, Wintoll's counsel
contracted with Jackson-Cross for Charles Seymour to serve "as
Wintoll's expert on the issue of the lost profits suffered as a result of the
defendants' breach of their financing commitment for [Wintoll's]
industrial rehabilitation project."26 It was decided that Seymour "would
quantify the damages sustained because of the lenders' failure to close
under the mortgage commitments; prepare a signed report outlining what
was done, stating the conclusions and supporting them; and participate
in pre-trial conferences, depositions and trial."2 7 Upon an agreement for
2

aBlanketImmunitySlidingAwayfromExpert Witnesses, LexVisio (June 28,2015),
https://www.lexvisio.com/articlet2Ol5/06/blanket-immunity-sliding-away-from-expertwitnesses.
2 Id.
2 740 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1999).
24
LLMD ofMich., 740 A.2d at 191.
2 Id. at 186.
N Id.
27
Id. at 186-87.
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the work, Jackson-Cross concluded in its report that the estimated
calculation of the lost profits was $6 million.2 8 However, Seymour did
not prepare the report; David Anderson, another employee of JacksonCross, prepared it."
At trial, Wintoll's counsel called Seymour to provide expert testimony
regarding the report that was prepared.o Counsel for defendants pointed
out on cross-examination that the estimated $6 million was wrong, due
to a mistake made in computing the lost profits." Seymour conceded that
the calculation was wrong because of the error that had been made.32
Because Seymour had not performed the calculations himself, he was
unable to explain the mathematical error in the calculations or to
recalculate the lost profits by correcting the error while on the stand."
Defense counsel requested that Seymour's opinion be stricken from the
record because it was based on inaccurate numbers and on erroneous
mathematical calculations." The trial judge granted the motion to strike
Seymour's testimony and instructed the jury to completely disregard the
testimony during its deliberations.35 The day after Seymour's testimony
was stricken, Wintoll accepted a settlement offer from the federal
defendants for approximately $750,000." Jackson-Cross subsequently
provided Wintoll with a corrected computation of estimated lost profits,
which indicated such damages amounted to $2.7 million. 7 On January
14,1993, Wintoll filed a civil action in the Philadelphia County Common
Pleas Court against Jackson-Cross, asserting causes of action for breach
of contract and professional malpractice.3 1 Wintoll asserted that JacksonCross had breached its agreement to furnish expert services in connection

29

Id. at 187.
LLMD Michigan, Inc., 740 A.2d at 187.

30

i

31

Id.

2

32
33id

3 Id.
3

LLMD ofMich., 740 A.2d at 187.

36 id.
37 id.
38id
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with the federal lawsuit by failing to deliver an accurate or workmanlike
lost profits computation, and had failed to exercise the degree of care and
skill ordinarily exercised by experts in the field of real estate counselling
and computation of lost profits in real estate transactions." Wintoll
alleged that it would have received a judgment for lost profits in an
amount in excess of $2.7 million plus interest but for the conduct of
Jackson-Cross, and thus requested not only the deficit between $2.7
million and $750,000, but also compensation for the costs ofthe expert.40
Wintoll's lawsuit directly challenged precedent by contending that the
witness immunity doctrine should not be extended to bar professional
malpractice claims against an expert that is retained for litigation.4 1
The court ruled that an expert witness was not immune from a
negligence action since a mathematical error completely undermined the
lost profits calculation and compromised the accuracy of the testimony
given at trial.42 The court also found that Seymour and Jackson-Cross
were negligent in the preparation and presentation of the report and
testimony and that the public's interest in accurate expert testimony
would not be advanced by allowing this conduct to be sheltered by the
witness immunity doctrine.43 The court, however, was careful when it
said:
We caution, however, that our holding on the witness immunity doctrine
does not preclude claims against an expert witness for professional malpractice has limited application. An expert witness may not be held liable merely
because his or her opinion is challenged by another expert or authoritative
source. In those circumstances, the judicial process is enhanced by the
presentation of different views. Differences of opinion will not suffice to
establish liability of an expert witness for professional negligence."

In October 1994, Boyes-Bogie retained Attorney Kenneth Soble of
Soble, VanDam, Pearlman & Gittlesohn to represent her in a divorce

39

id.

40Id.
41
42

LLMD ofMich., 740 A.2d at 188.
Id. at 191.

43
44Id.
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action against her husband Andrew Rogal ("Rogal").4 s Soble, acting on
behalf of Boyes-Bogie, retained Horvitz to provide expert litigation
support and testimony relating to the valuation of the RAI stock and
Rogal's 100% ownership interests in RAI and a related corporation."
Horvitz, a certified public accountant, had previously qualified as an
expert in business valuations in the Probate and Family Court.4 7 "Horvitz
agreed 'to perform a review of the accounting records and other related
data of [RAI and a related company] in order to determine the fair market
value of the corporate stock and Andrew Rogal's 100% ownership
interests."' Half a year later, Soble asked Horvitz about the status of
the job. 4 9 In each letter, Soble noted that he was at a stand-still until he
heard from Horvitz." Finally, after about eight months of sending letters,
Horvitz provided Soble with his conclusions, in which Horvitz concluded
"the results of all my analysis is a $2,989,500 gross value of the business
and a $2,093,000 net value after discounts attributed to Mr. Rogal's 100%
[ownership] interest."" Four months after receiving the report, the two
parties settled the case.5 2 However, Horvitz's methods used to comprise
the report did not adhere to "the applicable professional standards" and
provided a false value for the stock, which was actually worth more than
Horvitz stated.5 3 Boyes-Bogie drew his false conclusion based on the fact
"that the capitalized value of Rogal was $8.5 million;" however, no
evidence was presented on the record to support this valuation. 4
The issue in front of the Court was "whether the doctrine of witness
immunity protects a privately retained professional who negligently
provides litigation support services from liability in a case brought by

45 Boyes-Bogie v. Horvitz, No. 991868F, 2001 WL 1771989, at *1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. 31, 2001).
4 Id.
47

48 Id.
49

5 Id.
" Boyes-Bogie, 2001 WL 1771989, at *2.
52 I
53

Id.

54Id.

at *4 n.3.
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the individual who retained the expert."" Here the court stated that to
permit such a cause of action would serve to deter expert witnesses from
providing anything other than "accurate, reliable testimony.""
The court specifically said "byrequiring that the expert witness render
service to the degree of care, skill and proficiency commonly exercised
by the ordinarily skillful, careful and prudent members of their profession" the litigation process is enhanced." Furthermore, the court
reasoned that witnesses retained by a party are not objective witnesses
but are hired to bolster the hiring party's case. 8 Consequently, the court
explained, holding such experts responsible will provide better testimony
from experts due to the fear of being sued." Finally, the court stated that
"the negligent expert would enjoy immunity at the expense of the right
of the party who hired and paid the expert to enforce its contractual right
to competent work."'
Thus, the court concluded "that the doctrine of
witness immunity does not bar a claim for negligence against an expert
privately retained to provide litigation support services by the party who
retained the expert."'
In Connecticut, in an underlying personal injury action, the issue in
question was whether witness immunity applies when "an expert witness
... fail[s] to provide competent litigation support services." 62 in that
case, Harvey Pollock, an attorney from Canada, was retained by Melvin
Green to recover damages for injuries inflicted upon Green, during his
arrest, by Canadian police officers.6' Green alleged that the two police
officers who apprehended him exercised such force that Green was
permanently disabled." Pollock's complaint asserted that one of the

- Id. at *2.
6
Id. at *3.
7
1 Boyes-Bogie, 2001 WL 1771989, at *3 (quoting LLMD ofMich., Inc. v. JacksonCross Co., 740 A.2d 186, 191 (Pa. 1999)).
58 Id.

9 Id. at *3.
" Id. (citing Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 5 Cal. App. 4th 392, 404
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).
6
Id. at *4.
62
Pollock v. Panjabi, 781 A.2d 518, 521 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000).
63

d

6

Id.
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officers "placed Green in a 'full nelson' wrestling hold," which "fractured
his neck and rendered him a quadriplegic."s Pollock retained the
services of Manohar Murlidhar Panjabi, Ph.D., a professor at Yale
University, as a spinal biomechanics expert. Panjabi was hired to design
and conduct experiments to demonstrate how Green's neck injury and
quadriplegia were caused by the officer's full nelson hold."
Panjabi agreed that (a) he would prepare a report of his findings and
conclusions and appear in court to communicate his expert opinion, (b) he
would determine and explain the mechanism of Green's injuries using the
science of spinal biomechanics with the skill, due care and diligence
expected of a 'world-class spinal bio-mechanic,' (c) any experiment he
would use for the purpose of confirming his theory as to the biomechanics
of Green's injury and the results achieved thereof could be replicated by
other scientists and would be defensible among his scientific peers, (d) he
would ensure that all equipment he used in the gathering of data was fit for
its intended purpose and that the data generated thereby was reliable and (e)
he would adhere to the scientific process and methodology acceptable within
the scientific community."

Panjabi then hired Cholewicki and the two experts "allegedly used Yale's
facilities, equipment and personnel to conduct the experiments to recreate
the forces exerted on Green when [the officer] placed him in the full
nelson hold."'
Panjabi provided Green and his counsel with proof that the officer's
actions were the sole cause of the injury, although the two experts had
used a dysfunctional component that led to their conclusion."9 The court
thus found that the unreliable evidence could not be introduced to the
court.o Pollock sought a continuance to allow for more tests with
functional equipment, and the court
granted the request on the conditions that (1) the original experiment be
exactly replicated and any subsequent testimony of Panjabi be confined to

65

id.

6 Id.
6
Pollock, 781 A.2d at 521-22.
" Id. at 522 (citation omitted).
6 Id.
70

id.
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the new results, and (2) before Panjabi's testimony would be admissible at
trial, it would have to be established that the load cell in Panjabi's original
experiment actually had been defective."

However, each time Panjabi conducted the new experiments, he did not
comply with the court's first condition.7 2 Further, Pollock paid Panjabi
an additional fee for each additional experiment." Pollock and Green
filed suit, naming Panjabi, Cholewicki, and Yale as defendants who
negatively affected Green and the outcome of the case.74
Similar to the previous cases mentioned, Green was adamant that the
defendants were protected by witness immunity." The court began its
analysis by acknowledging the long-standing rule "that there is an
absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings."76 The
court further stated:
The effect of an absolute privilege is that damages cannot be recovered for
a defamatory statement even if it is published falsely and maliciously. The
policy underlying the privilege is that in certain situations the public interest
in having people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.

The court then distinguished these facts from the instant case deciding,
that the policy concerns were inapplicable in this case at hand.
The
court recognized that the plaintiffs grievance in the case at hand was the
defendants' failure to adhere to a contract and abide by professional
standards in doing so." The court cited LLMD of Michigan, Inc. v.

n1 Pollock, 781 A.2d at 522-23.
7 Id. at 522-23.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 523.
7
Id. at 524.
76
Id. (quoting Petyan v. Ellis, 510 A.2d 1337, 1338 (Conn. 1986), superseded by
statute, CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-17b (West 2014), as recognized in Chadha v.

Charlotte Hungerford Hosp., 865 A.2d 1163, 1171-77 (Conn. 2005))
77
Pollock, 781 A.2d at 524 (quotingPetyan,510 A.2d at 1338 (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
78
Id. at 525.
79
Id. at 525-26.
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Jackson-Cross Co.so as both factual and legal precedent."' The court
explained that the mathematical error committed by the defendants in that
case resulted in expert witness opinion "stricken from the record."8 Once
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the concept of witness
immunity, it found that "[t]he judicial process will be enhanced only by
requiring that an expert witness render services to the degree ofcare, skill
and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful
and prudent members of their profession."" As a result, the Superior
Court of Connecticut also ruled in accordance with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and held the witness immunity doctrine did not bar
Pollock's lawsuit for failure to provide proper expert witness testimony."
In Missouri, the court in Murphy v. A.A. Mathews held that if a
professional is negligent as a witness or consultant in a lawsuit, then
witness immunity does protect the expert witness." In Murphy, the
plaintiff (American Drilling Service Company Liquidating Trust, of
which Clifford Murphy was trustee) appealed after its engineering
malpractice claim was dismissed." The malpractice suit was related to
the plaintiff s contract with Zurn for engineering work." Issues throughout Zurn's work led to unexpected expenses for the plaintiffs."
In 1980, American retained Mathews, as professional engineers, to prepare
claims for additional compensation from Zurn and to present those claims
at an arbitration proceeding, if necessary. Mathews testified at the arbitration proceeding on behalf of American for additional compensation in the
amount of $4,888,390. The arbitrators awarded American $1,118,608.9

Originally, American Drilling filed its Complaint against Mathews on
October 23, 1984, but thereafter on August 14, 1990, it filed an amended
" 740 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1999).
8! Pollock, 781 A.2d at 528 (citing LLMD ofMich., 740 A.2d at 186-87, 191).
82
Id. (citing LLMD ofMich., 740 A.2d at 187).
83
LLMD ofMich., 740 A.2d at 191.
" Pollock, 781 A.2d at 529.
8 841 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
1 Murphy, 841 S.W.2d
at 672.
87
Id.
88

Id.

89Id
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complaint alleging negligence in Count l and breach of contract in Count
II against Matthews for failing to provide professional expert services
as an engineer."o After almost a week and a half of trial, the negligence
claim was dismissed by the court due to the doctrine of witness
immunity." Once the matter reached the Supreme Court of Missouri,
the Court, using the standard of review for a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action, took the plaintiff's version of the facts at face
value in presenting its decision.9 2 Among the facts the court accepted
was that the defendants attempted to "condense the claims data and
oversimplify the record" rendering the claims by American Drilling
"vague, unspecific and ambiguous."93 American Drilling argued that,
under Missouri law, this finding would support a claim for professional
negligence.9 4 Mathews responded by asserting the defense of witness
immunity to the allegations made by American Drilling." The court
ruled that none of the underlying policy reasons for granting witness
immunity justified extending immunity to an expert witness such as <
Mathews.9 6 The court reasoned that granting witness immunity is an
exception, not the general rule.97 Further, the court reasoned that in the 7state of Missouri, witness immunity is generally only applicable to
"defamation, defamation-type, or retaliatory cases against adverse
witnesses."' The court did recognize, however, that witness immunity
could be expanded in different circumstances."
However, the court decided that American Drilling's claim for negligence against Matthews was not prohibited due to witness immunity a
because witness immunity was not does not protect a "privately retained
professional who negligently provides litigation support services."' 00 The
90

Id.

91 Id.

92Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 672.
93
Id. at 673.
94 Id.
9

1Id. at 674.
9Id.
at 680.
9 Id. at 673 (citing Laun v. Union Elec., 166 S.W.2d 1065, 1069 (Mo. 1942)).
9
Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 673.
9 Id. at 680.
100 Id.
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Court posited that, in Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Associates Engineers,
0 the Missouri court overstated the holding in Briscoe v. LaHue'0 2
Inc.,o'
by recognizing that it "establish[ed] a single immunity for all participants
involved in ajudicial proceeding." 0 The Byrne-Stevens stated "that [t]he
mere fact that the expert is retained and compensated by a party does not
change the fact that, as a witness, he is a participant in a judicial proceeding. It is that status on which immunity rests."'" The Supreme Court
of Missouri ruled that Briscoe was not intended to have such a widespread effect.os Unlike Briscoe, the case did not involve a police officer
testifying as to facts observed. 0 6 The court subsequently determined
that testimony of an expert witness is very distinguishable from a police
officer testifying as to facts observed.' 7 Expert witness testimony is
typically paid for by one party and involves an expert analysis of the facts
presented in a manner that helps the case of the party paying for the
expert witness.'0 o The court concluded that imposing liability would
encourage experts to be cautious and professional to avoid being sued.'"
"Mathews voluntarily agreed to provide these services and thereby also
to assume the duty of care of a skillful professional in exchange for a
$350,000 fee."" 0 The court ruled that the doctrine of witness immunity
did not prohibit American Drilling's claim for damages against Mathews
for negligently providing expert witness services."'
In California, Mattco Forge, Inc. sold products to General Electric and
several other -businesses."12 After losing General Electric as a buyer,
776 P.2d 666 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
102 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
103 Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 680 (citing Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assoc. Eng'rs,
Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 668-69 (Wash. 1989) (en banc)) (citation omitted).
') Id. (quoting Bruce, 776 P.2d at 669).
101

105Id.

'06 Id. at 680-8 1.
107 Id. at 680.
'"Id. at 681.
'"Id.
110 Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 682.
"'

Id.

Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 784 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997).
112
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Mattco filed suit against General Electric, alleging discrimination. 13
Mattco hired Arthur Young, an accounting firm, as an expert to calculate
Mattco's lost profits when GE removed Mattco as its supplier.' 14 The
managing partner at Arthur Young assured the owner of Mattco, Mateo
Minguez, of the firm's ability to provide experts who "were specially
trained in legal procedures."" Arthur Young then assigned Tom Blumer
to the job, though he had no such litigation training or experience.' 16
Upon reviewing Mattco's records in order to calculate damages,
Blumer discovered twenty-six missing estimate sheets, generated as bids
for prospective customers, and asked Minguez to recreate them.' 17
During discovery, General Electric made "a request for all documents
Arthur Young had relied on in calculating damages.""' Blumer provided
the documents and never disclosed to GE that the estimate sheets were
recreated."' After reviewing the documents, GE filed "a counterclaim
against Mattco for procurement fraud or bid rigging."120 The court
ordered sanctions against Mattco that prevented the case from progressing.' 2 ' The court's "sanction order then found that 'in an attempt to
fraudulently increase the damages they seek, [Mattco & Minguez] altered
and fabricated estimate sheets used to help calculate damages' and
"further [found] that [Mattco & Minguez] knowingly produced those
false estimate sheets to [GE], and thereby perpetrated a fraud upon
defendants."' 22 The sanction went further to prohibit Arthur Young's
future involvement in the case.1 2 3 The court assessed a $1.4 million
sanction against Mattco and Minguez and further stated that it would
dismiss Mattco's lawsuit if the money was not paid within forty-five
"3

Id. at 783.

4

Id. at 784.

1

115 Id.

"6 Id. (footnote omitted).
"'Id. at 784.
118Id.
" Mattco Forge, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780 at 784.
20
1 Id. at 785.
I2 1id.

'22Id.
123 Id.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY

30

[Vol. 42:15

days." Rather than pay the sanction, Mattco settled the lawsuit with GE,
and both parties dropped their claims against each other. 12 5
Subsequently, Mattco brought a professional malpractice lawsuit
against Arthur Young.1 26 At trial, Young asserted "that Mattco had to
meet the burden of a trial-within-a-trial." 127 This meant "that Mattco had
to prove it would have reached trial in the federal lawsuit, prevailed and
obtained ajudgment against GE."l 28 The trial court disagreed and ruled
that Mattco only needed to show Young had caused Mattco to suffer
"harm." 29 On appeal, the court stated that Mattco's cause of action
against Young was sustainable and was similar to a legal malpractice
lawsuit. 3 o The appeals court went on to state that Mattco, as the plaintiff
in such a lawsuit, "ha[d] the burden to establish that had Arthur Young
properly handled the underlying case, Mattco would have prevailed
against GE."" The court established the following prima facie elements
for an expert witness negligence case:
(1) [T]he professional was negligent in the handling of the prior lawsuit; (2)
the professional's negligence was a substantial factor in the plaintiff's loss
of the prior lawsuit; and (3) the proper handling of the prior lawsuit by the
professional would have resulted in a collectible judgment in plaintiff's
favor. 132

Aside from foregoing state court precedent, one federal court also
addressed the issue of immunity for friendly expert witnesses in Marrogi
v. Howard.'3 3 Dr. Aizenhawar Marrogi sued the Tulane Educational Fund

Id.
" Mauco Forge, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780 at 786.
'" Id. at 783.
27
I Id. at 786.
I28
id.
124

1

129 Id.
30

Id. at 790.

' Mattco Forge, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790 (citing Walker v. Porter, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 468 (Ct. App. 1974) (involving a plaintiff in a legal malpractice case who did not
need to prove which co-defendant caused her injury in order to be successful)).
32
' Mattco Forge, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
" 805 So. 2d 1118 (La. 2002).
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(d/b/a Tulane University School of Medicine) to recover compensation
for medical services Marrogi performed while employed at Tulane.'3 4
Marrogi hired Ray Howard as an expert to assist in his claim.'35 Howard
agreed to "review pathology reports," submit his findings to Marrogi's
Louisiana attorney, and to testify in depositions, hearings and at trial."3
According to Howard's findings, for one of five fiscal years in
question, Tulane should have billed $523,485 for the medical services
provided by Marrogi-more than twice the $250,000 Tulane actually
billed.1 37 Based on this analysis, Marrogi sought to obtain Tulane's
record for the other four years.' 3 ' However, "[a]t the hearing on the
motion to compel, Tulane pointed to numerous mathematical errors in
Howard's affidavit, as well as errors in his assignment ofprices to coded
services."' Howard recalculated the numbers, this time finding that
$392,740 is what actually should have been billed. " At Howard's courtordered deposition, Howard privately expressed his embarrassment and
apologies for the issues to counsel for Marrogi and indicated that he
would not continue with any aspect ofthe case because ofhis mistakes. 141
Tulane, upon Howard's withdrawal as an expert witness, filed a summary
judgement motion contending that Marrogi could not present "any
credible evidence ofunderbilling."l 42 The court granted Tulane's motion
for summary judgment.1 43
Following the granting of the motion, Marrogi filed suit against
Howard, claiming breach of contract and negligence "or in the alternative,
134

Marrogi, 805 So. 2d at 1120 n.2 ("While employed by Tulane, Marrogi, a pathologist, participated in the Faculty Practice Plan, which requires Tulane as administrators/fiduciaries to bill and collect for the participant's professional services
performed for patients at Tulane's various clinics or hospitals and then distribute to the
participant a percentage of the collected money.").
135id.
136Id.
137 id.
138

id.

'39

Id. at 1120.

'40 Marrogi, 805 So. 2d at 1121.
I

41

142
143

Id.
Id.
id.
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unjust enrichment."" Marrogi's claim of negligence asserted that
Howard's many mathematical errors-despite having held himself out
as an expert in medical billing and coding-directly resulted in the
dismissal ofMarrogi's case against Tulane. 145 Marrogi also insisted "that
Howard's actions breached the professional duties owed to Dr. Marrogi,
and that Howard [was] liable to Dr. Marrogi for all losses incurred as a
result thereof."" Howard countered by seeking dismissal of the case
because he was owed absolute witness immunity.14 7 Marrogi countered,
claiming that friendly experts may be sued for expert reports in which
the applicable professional standards were not adhered to.14 ' Even though
the district court judge granted Howard's motion to dismiss, the judge
recognized "a certain logic to the rationale adopted by" the court in
LLMD ofMichigan, Inc. v. Jackson-CrossCo.1 49 The court also noted
"that making an exception to the general rule of witness immunity for
retained expert witnesses might entail 'a multitude of evidentiary and
practical problems in its application."'" On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals specifically tackled the issue of whether witness
immunity should apply to friendly expert witnesses, and concluded that
the question is more fit for the Supreme Court of Louisiana."' In
Louisiana, "[t]he policy basis [of witness immunity] has been explained
as follows: 'The administration of justice requires the testimony of
witnesses to be unrestrained by liability to vexatious litigation. The
words they utter are protected by the occasion, and cannot be the founda-

'"Id.
145 id.
'"Marrogi, 805 So. 2d at 1121.
47
' Id. at 1121 n.4 ("Howard also sought dismissal on the grounds that venue was
improper in Louisiana and that the federal district court had no personal jurisdiction
over the defendant because all of the actions complained of had transpired in the State
of Florida. Alternatively, Howard sought transfer to the federal district court in
Jacksonville, Florida, on the ground of forum non-conveniens.").
'"Id. at 1121.
149 Id. at 1121-22 (quoting Marrogi v. Howard, No. Civ. A. 00-368, 2000 WL
777914, at *3 (E.D. La. 2000), rev'd, 282 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing LLMD of
Mich., Inc. v. Jackson, 740 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1999)).
15 o Id. at 1122.
51
' Id.

2018]

EXPERT WITNESS MALPRACTICE

33

tion for an action for slander."' 152 Absolute witness immunity has been
applied in Louisiana to retaliation cases, including when the adverse
witness was an expert.'5 3
In analyzing both Marrogi's and Howard's arguments, the Fifth Circuit
evaluated LLMD ofMichigan.154 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
LLMD ofMichigan concluded that the doctrine ofwitness immunity does
not preclude malpractice actions against professionals hired to perform
services related to litigation.'"
In Marrogi the Fifth Circuit found that the doctrine of witness
immunity did not bar claims against experts, retained for litigation, for
an "alleged failure to provide competent litigation support."' The court
found that the public policy rationale of immunity from tort liability,
"generally . . . recognized only to promote an overarching public
purpose," should be narrowly construed. ' A narrow construction would
naturally exclude any immunity that failed to promote the "overarching
public purpose" of facilitating a fair and balanced presentation of the
facts.'58 Thus, it naturally follows that "immunizing the incompetence
of a party's retained expert witness simply because he or she provides
... testimony" or other professional services fails to fall within the
narrow construction, promote the "overarching public purpose," or assist
the fact-finder in ascertaining the trust.'15 The Fifth Circuit stated juries
must be presented with accurate information and concluded that the
doctrine ofwitness immunity is a necessary tool in ensuring such accurate
52

Marrogi, 805 So. 2d at 1124 (quoting Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375, 376
(La. 1869)). In Terry v. Fellows, the defendant testified before Congress that the
plaintiffhad participated in a "rebellion against the United States" government and had
carried a flag emblazoned with "a skull and crossbones, which meant no quarter to the
enemy in the fight." Fellows, 21 La. Ann. at 375-76 (quotations omitted). The plaintiff
later sued for libel and slander, but his suit was dismissed for no cause of action. Id. at
375. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Id. at 377. Because the defendant
"was compelled to answer the questions propounded to him by the committee," the
defendant was protected by witness immunity. Id. at 376.
1
3 Marrogi, 805 So. 2d at 1126..
1

'4

740 A.2d 186.

.s. LLMD ofMich., 740 A.2d at 191.
"6 Marrogi, 805 So. 2d at 1131.
' 7 Id. at 1131-32.
15 Id.
1 Id.
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testimony.'" The expert's job is not only to clarify a case, but also to
advocate for the party's position in a case."" According to the Fifth
Circuit, "the absence of immunity w[ould] not only encourage the expert
witness to exercise more care in. formulating his or her opinion but
w[ould] also protect the litigant from the negligence of an incompetent
professional.""6 2
Although a small sampling of cases, courts faced with this issue appear
to value protecting the innocent client from the negligence of a retained
expert over the policy behind granting immunity to witnesses.

I. The Consequences of Not Granting
Friendly Expert Witnesses Immunity
from Civil Liability
Granting witnesses immunity from civil liability, especially friendly
expert witnesses, is a deeply rooted doctrine designed to uphold the
integrity ofthe judicial process.' Additionally, it encourages those with
something to say in court to do so without fear of reprisal.'" These
principles, to some, ensure that the trial process has the best chance of
providing truthful and unguarded testimony.1 6 1 In this way, a jury or
judge can decide, based on the facts that are provided through the adversarial trial process, what happened.'6 Therefore, witness immunity in
this context supports the quest for justice among litigants. 6
"nId. at 1132 (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333 (1983)).
Id.

161

I62 id.

'6 See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330-31 ("The immunity of parties and witnesses from
subsequent damages liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings was well
established in English common law." (footnote omitted) (citing Cutler v. Dixon, 76
Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B. 1585); Anfield v. Feverhill, 80 Eng. Rep. 1113 (K.B. 1614);
Henderson v. Broomhead, 157 Eng. Rep. 964, 968 (Ex. 1859); Dawkins v. Lord
Rokeby, 176 Eng. Rep. 800, 812 (C.P. 1866))).
'"Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
'"Id. at 333-35 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,439 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring)).

' Id. at 333-34 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 439 (White, J., concurring)).
67
' Id. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 440 (White, J., concurring)).
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On the other hand, providing access to the courts so that any aggrieved
individual has a chance to redress said grievance in the adversarial trial
process is the bedrock of the judicial system.'" Absent this access,
people will be left helpless and will be forced to bear the consequences
of the unjust actions of others. To some this principle assures not only
the integrity of the judicial system but also serves the interests of a
democratic republic. When these two principles collide (as in the question of friendly expert witness immunity to civil liability), the courts must
tread carefully in the pursuit of justice. Yet based on the cases in the
selected states that have permitted a civil claim for malpractice against
a friendly expert witness, perhaps this apparent collision of two fundamental principles is a false equivalency.
Although few jurisdictions have permitted a cause of action against
a friendly expert witness, the burden on a complaining plaintiff in this
kind of case is substantial.'" The courts have equated this burden to the
burden of proving lawyer malpractice, which amounts to two cases in
one-proof of expert negligence and then proof that absent the expert
negligence, the complaining party would have prevailed in the case or
not been harmed by the outcome of the case.1 70 This two-stage process
is risky and expensive, and therefore, may have its own chilling effect
on potential clients and lawyers taking on such a case, absent compelling
proof. In short, to take on this kind of expert witness malpractice case
is a big decision for not only clients but lawyers as well. Granted, any
decision to litigate a claim is an important decision for both clients and
lawyers. However, some kinds of cases are fraught with more pitfalls
then others. Perhaps the expert witness malpractice case fits this kind of
concern because it entails essentially trying two cases in an effort to win
one case. These considerations alone indicate that, even if permitting
t6 See Murphy v. A.A. Matthews, 841 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Mo. 1992) (en banc)
(stating that granting immunity to witnesses "affords litigants free access to the courts
to secure and defend their rights").
16 See LLMD of Mich., Inc. v. Jackson-Cross Co., 740 A.2d 186, 191 (Pa. 1999)
(The concept of allowing suit "against an expert witness for professional malpractice
has limited application. An expert witness may not be held liable merely because his
or her opinion is challenged by another expert or authoritative source.").
"o Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 788-89 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997).
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aggrieved plaintiffs or defendants to litigate an expert malpractice
lawsuit, the courts would not be flooded with expert witness malpractice
cases. Not all experts are negligent, and even if a particular expert is
negligent, that does not mean the complaining party will win the case.
The argument that witnesses will be better if the fear of civil liability
does not exist cuts both ways. The threat of civil liability may just be
incentive for a witness to be better. Access to the court does not remove
the court's authority to deny admission of expert witness testimony.
Either you trust the system-the trial process-or you do not. There are
protections built into the trial process designed to root out false and
misleading testimony. To hold the expert witness liable for malpractice
when the expert fails to live up to the standard of care furthers both
principles-the goal of providing access to the court and, by example,
sends a message to all expert witnesses to be careful and be truthful.
California, after an expert witness was found liable for malpractice,
approved a cause of action by the expert witness to seek indemnification
from the lawyer."' In this case, the lawyer hired the expert witness, but
the expert witness was later sued by the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs lost
the case.' 72 Such a claim essentially argues that the lawyer who hired the
expert witness can be held liable for the lawyer's own negligence in
hiring the expert witness.7' Thus, it follows that lawyers should become
increasingly careful during the process of acquiring an expert witness for
his case. The expert witness lawsuit against the lawyer will take on the
same process as a legal negligence case with essentially two cases in
one-it must be proved that the lawyer was negligent and then proved
that, absent the lawyer's negligence, the party would have won the
case. 17' This is the logical extension of permitting an expert witness
malpractice case and puts another on notice, namely the lawyer, that
hiring an expert witness who fails to provide competent testimony may
not just be the legal responsibility of the expert witness.

' Forensis Group, Inc. v. Frantz, Townsend & Foldenauer, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622,
624-25, 641 (Ct. App. 2005).
'7 Id. at 624.
I7 Id. at 635-36 (citations omitted).
74
1 Id. at 635 (citations omitted).
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Conclusion
Often the outcome of a legal dispute rests on the quality of an expert
witness's testimony. Therefore, the quality of the work done by these
expert witnesses cannot be taken as a given. Furthermore, the quality
of the work done by the lawyer cannot be taken as a given either. What
is a given in many states, based on precedent, is that the hiring client is
offered little to nothing by way of access to the court to plead a case of
expert witness malpractice. By not allowing such a claim, an expert
witness is free (short of committing perjury) to testify however the expert
witness wants. This bar on expert witness malpractice claims may
promote truthfulness and candor but also tempts lying and obfuscation.
In the end, access to the court is a principle that complements, rather than
collides, with the principle of insuring candid and truthful testimony.
Expert witness malpractice lawsuits serve both principles well.
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